It is no secret that the measure was taken unilaterally by one hand, as reasons given.
See well, the purpose of this thread is not to question or discuss about the decision making, method or reasons, since in fact there was an emergency, so let’s go ahead and get down to business:
TG member @sunchaser23 presented an idea, which was automatically assimilated as admissible as best practice in an adaptation by @shizzle135 and myself, that in theory defines the ability to withdraw USDN from vesting (remembering that there are not only bad players in the system), so let’s get to it.
It is possible to base the USDN vesting withdrawal limit based on the BR of the stablecoin, promoting that the withdrawal capacity will be directly related to the backing ratio.
In this way we could observe as example configuration only the following limit table:
BR 5% → 1k withdrawal
BR 10% → 2.5k withdrawal
BR 15% → 5k withdrawals
BR 20% → 7.5k withdrawal
BR 25% → 10k withdrawal
The configuration can be the most varied in its values, anyway the principle is to allow the capacity of absorption of the withdrawals by the market, making the responsibility subsidiary and more fair.
In conclusion, the effect may be directly proportional to the conditioning and possible increase in the BR of the neutrino project without prejudice to both.
We cannot forget that the peg of a stablecoin is also associated in much in its dilution in the existing open markets, in the concentration and density within the 1:1 spread of the order book, i.e., the investor in neutrino is not the only and exclusive responsible for the deppeg added to the evident risk that is the concentration of an excessive amount of a certain asset in the hand of a single speculator.